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41 
ACHIEVING FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS FOR 
OKLAHOMA’S JUVENILES: THE ROLE FOR 
COMPETENCY IN JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS 
MARY SUE BACKUS* 
Introduction 
As a matter of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, a criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to be competent to stand trial.1  In fact, 
at all stages of the criminal justice process a defendant must be able to 
understand the proceedings and be capable of consulting with and assisting 
his lawyer with his defense.2  Although the United States Supreme Court 
has held that the Due Process Clause requires that criminal defendants must 
be competent, the Court has never addressed whether that competency 
requirement applies to juvenile proceedings.  Left to their own devices on 
this issue, an overwhelming majority of states have established, either 
through statute or case law, a right to competence in juvenile proceedings.3  
In fact, experts in the field consider the question to be “settled” and often 
cite Oklahoma as the lone exception.4 
In contrast to the overwhelming majority of states, the Oklahoma Court 
of Criminal Appeals has found that extending the right of adjudicative 
competence5 to juveniles is neither appropriate nor necessary.6  That 
conclusion was based on the rehabilitative nature of juvenile proceedings 
and the court’s confidence in the juvenile system’s capacity to consider and 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law.  An earlier version of 
this article appeared in the Oklahoma Bar Journal, Competency in Juvenile Delinquency 
Proceedings, 82 OKLA. B.J. 20 (2011). 
 1. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). 
 2. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
 3. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, 
and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 801 (2005). 
 4. Id. at 833-34; see also IVAN KRUH & THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATION OF JUVENILES’ 
COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL 20 (2009) (“It is now a ‘virtually inescapable conclusion’ that 
CST [competence to stand trial] is required in juvenile court.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 5. The terms “competence to stand trial” and “adjudicative competency” will be used 
interchangeably throughout this article.  The term “competence to stand trial,” or CST, is the 
traditional term that has been in use for centuries.  With the shift away from criminal trials to 
a system wherein plea bargains account for the vast majority of criminal cases, the term 
“adjudicative competence” more accurately reflects the broad array of criminal proceedings 
where competence is required to proceed.  See PATRICIA A. ZAPF & RONALD ROESCH, 
EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL 5-6 (2009). 
 6. G.J.I. v. State, 778 P.2d 485, 487 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). 
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accommodate issues of mental health in adjudicating young Oklahomans as 
delinquent.  Over two decades have passed since the court staked out what 
is now an atypical approach to juvenile competency.  Dramatic changes in 
the juvenile system combined with new insights on adolescent brain 
development suggest that it is time for Oklahoma to reevaluate its outlier 
position and acknowledge that it is necessary to address issues of juvenile 
competency in order to ensure the fundamental fairness to which juveniles 
are entitled. 
The appropriate role of juvenile competence is a complex question, 
however.  To say that an overwhelming majority of states incorporates a 
right to competency in juvenile proceedings is not to say that there is any 
consistency or universal agreement on what that standard should be or 
precisely when it applies.7  Because a juvenile may be treated in a number 
of different ways under the Oklahoma criminal code, —as a juvenile, as an 
adult, or as a hybrid youthful offender—questions of juvenile adjudicative 
competence can arise in different contexts and thus may require different 
approaches.  Even if Oklahoma is able to maintain its parens patriae 
philosophy in juvenile adjudications, with a judge acting as a benevolent 
parent in the best interests of the child to meet individualized, rehabilitative 
goals, that philosophy is not the primary motivating construct when a 
juvenile is tried or sentenced as an adult or Youthful Offender.  Where 
considerations of punishment trump rehabilitation, it is an illusion that the 
traditional juvenile court philosophy can adequately address a juvenile’s 
right to competency and ensure fundamental fairness in juvenile 
proceedings as required by the Supreme Court.8 
This article considers Oklahoma’s outlier position on the right of 
juveniles to be competent before being adjudicated in juvenile court.  More 
specifically, it raises questions about the applicability of the rejection of 
that right in G.J.I. v. Oklahoma9 to juveniles tried or sentenced as adults or 
youthful offenders.  Part I begins with a discussion of the fundamental due 
process right of competence, including its rationale and the legal criteria 
established for finding adult criminal defendants incompetent.  Part II 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern 
Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 353, 369-74 (2001) (describing the variation 
among states in statutory provisions and case law relating to adjudicative competence in the 
juvenile court).  
 8. “[T]he applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings, as developed by 
Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness.”  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 
(1971). 
 9. 778 P.2d 485 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). 
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explores the evolution of the modern juvenile justice system and the three 
trends prompting states to develop competency policies to ensure 
fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings.  Part III considers how the 
three trends in juvenile justice are reflected in Oklahoma’s approach to 
juveniles and identifies two points in the system where the lack of a 
competence right raises significant due process concerns. 
I. The Right to Competence 
The doctrine that a criminal defendant should not be tried while mentally 
incompetent is firmly entrenched in English and American legal history 
with roots dating at least to mid-seventeenth-century England.  Blackstone, 
who recognized that a defendant should neither plead nor be tried if 
mentally defective, wrote that a defendant who became "mad" after the 
commission of an offense should not be arraigned "because he is not able to 
plead . . . with the advice and caution that he ought," and should not be 
tried, for "how can he make his defense?"10  Another early and frequently 
cited English formulation for judging adjudicative competence required the 
jury first to consider whether a defendant was “mute of malice or not; 
secondly, whether he can plead to the indictment or not; thirdly, whether he 
is of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of proceedings on the 
trial . . . .”11   
In the nineteenth century, United States federal courts adopted these 
British common law rules virtually intact.  Federal courts cited common 
law authority, for example, to hold that “[i]t is not ‘due process of law to 
subject an insane person to trial upon an indictment involving liberty or 
life.’”12  Early American decisions also echoed Blackstone’s concern about 
the inability of an incompetent defendant to mount a defense, framing the 
question as whether a defendant is able “to properly and intelligently aid his 
counsel in making a rational defense.”13  Other courts considered whether 
the defendant was “capable of properly appreciating his peril and of 
rationally assisting in his own defense.”14 
Mirroring this common law understanding, the U.S. Supreme Court 
crafted a test of incompetence in its landmark decision in Dusky v. United 
                                                                                                                 
 10. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24. 
 11. King v. Pritchard, 173 Eng. Rep. 135, 135 (1836). 
 12. Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899) (internal citation omitted). 
 13. United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 286 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906). 
 14. United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724, 725 (D. Or. 1941). 
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States.15  The legal standard for competency focuses on a defendant’s 
functional capabilities as they relate to participation in the trial process:  
“[T]he ‘test must be whether [a defendant] has sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.’”16  In Drope v. Missouri the 
Court further clarified that a competent defendant must be able to “assist in 
preparing his defense.”17  Through Dusky and Drope, the Supreme Court 
has articulated three separate factors required for competency.  In order to 
be competent, defendants must be able to:  (1) consult with defense 
counsel; (2) otherwise assist with their defense; and, (3) have a rational and 
factual understanding of the proceedings.18  
In Oklahoma, as in every other state,19 this fundamental constitutional 
right is embodied in a general competency statute which mirrors the 
Dusky/Drope standard.  The Oklahoma statute states:  “No person shall be 
subject to any criminal procedures after the person is determined to be 
incompetent . . . .”20 and defines incompetence as the “present inability of a 
person arrested for or charged with a crime to understand the nature of the 
charges and proceedings brought against him or her and to effectively and 
rationally assist in his or her defense.”21 
Since the standard established in Dusky and Drope, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly and consistently recognized that the criminal trial of an 
incompetent defendant violates due process, emphasizing that this basic 
requirement is the foundation for a host of other rights essential to a fair 
trial.22  This functional focus of the standard recognizes that competence is 
required to exercise vital trial rights.  Justice Kennedy described the 
fundamental nature of the right as follows: 
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the 
main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, 
including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to 
summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the  
 
                                                                                                                 
 15. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 16. Id. at 402 (internal citation omitted). 
 17. 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). 
 18. Id.; Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.  
 19. Zapf & Roesch, supra note 5, at 8. 
 20. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1175.2(A) (2011). 
 21. Id. § 1175.1(2). 
 22. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (internal citations omitted). 
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right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without 
penalty for doing so.23 
The accuracy and fairness of our criminal justice system depends upon 
the capability of the advocates to marshal the facts in support of their 
position and fully present their evidence.  When each side is fully 
developed and zealously presented, the judge or jury is in the best position 
to ascertain the truth.  Thus, proceeding against an incompetent defendant 
who is incapable of assisting his attorney to fully present the evidence is 
contrary to the adversary process itself and undermines the validity of the 
verdict as well as public confidence in the criminal justice system.24  
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has characterized the right to 
competence as “fundamental to an adversary system of justice,”25 the 
practical application of this very general legal standard is challenging, both 
in its substance and in its frequency.  Judges, juries, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and mental health professionals are all called upon to consider 
issues of competency.  Although accurate statistics of incompetent criminal 
defendants are hard to come by, the prevalence of mental health problems 
in the prison population, which is well documented,26 suggests that mental 
health issues are common among those who come into contact with the 
criminal justice system.27  According to the American Bar Association 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1992) (internal citations omitted). 
 24. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that "[t]he very premise of our 
adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will 
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." 
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975); see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 
225, 230-31 (1975) ("We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in 
which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant 
facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal 
justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative 
presentation of the facts.  The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in 
the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts . . . .") (quoting United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)). 
 25. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). 
 26. The U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics has found that more than 
half of the prison and jail inmates have mental health problems.  See DORIS J. JAMES & 
LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:  
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES at 1 (No. NCJ 213600, 2006), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=789. 
 27. Mental illness obviously may impact competency, but mental illness alone does 
not inevitably result in a finding of incompetence.  See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL 
HEALTH STANDARDS 175 (1989) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (“If defendants are capable 
of meeting the articulated requirements for competence, the presence or absence of mental 
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(ABA), competency is, quantitatively speaking, “the single most important 
issue in the criminal mental health field.”28  Estimates indicate that between 
two percent and eight percent of all criminal defendants are referred for 
competency evaluations, resulting in nearly 60,000 or more annual 
competency evaluations in the United States.29 
In addition to its frequency, the substance of the competence 
determination remains challenging.  Because the Dusky/Drope standard 
provides few specifics, practitioners have identified a number of 
competence-related abilities used to assess competence, including the 
ability to understand the charges, the current legal situation, relevant facts, 
legal issues and procedures, the roles of court personnel, and potential legal 
defenses and dispositions.30  Nevertheless, professional evaluators have 
struggled with the application of the general competency standards to 
individual defendants.  With a competency standard that speaks in terms of 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding, the inquiry is by its nature 
                                                                                                                 
illness is irrelevant.  Conversely, defendants may not be mentally ill yet may be incompetent 
to stand trial.  Legal criteria, not medical or psychological diagnostic categories, govern 
competency.  Hence, the presence or absence of mental illness, while certainly significant in 
evaluating defendant competence is by no means conclusive.”). 
 In contrast, the federal Insanity Defense Reform Act appears to require that 
incompetence be a result of a mental disease or defect.  That statute states that in 
determining mental competency to stand trial or to undergo post-release proceedings, a court 
must find that the defendant is “presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering 
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4241(d) (2006). 
 28. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 168. 
 29. Zapf & Roesch, supra note 5, at 3; see also Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice 
Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW, 35, S3-S72 (2007), available at http://www.jaapl.org/content/ 
35/Supplement_4/S3.full (citing statistics showing a significant increase in the frequency of 
competence evaluations from 25,000-36,000 in 1973 to 50,000 in 1998 to 60,000 in 2000). 
 30. According to one source, the following relevant areas of inquiry are the best practice 
in forensic mental health assessment for competence:  (1) capacity to understand the arrest 
process; (2) capacity to comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations; (3) capacity 
to disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; (4) capacity to comprehend 
and appreciate the range and nature of potential penalties that may be imposed; (5) capacity 
to appreciate the likely outcome of the proceedings; (6) basic knowledge of legal strategies 
and options; (7) capacity to engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options 
(decision making); (8) capacity to understand the adversarial nature of the proceedings; (9) 
capacity to manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; (10) capacity to participate in trial; 
(11) capacity to testify relevantly; and (12) relationship with counsel.  Zapf & Roesch, supra 
note 5, at 181-83. 
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flexible and context dependent.31  But even though it would seem that there 
may be degrees of competency, where a defendant is capable of making 
some decisions but not others, the Supreme Court has nonetheless made it 
clear that competency is an either/or proposition.  A defendant is either 
competent or he is not for all adjudicative proceedings, including the right 
to waive counsel or to plead guilty.32  Whatever the inquiry, the central 
rationale underlying the right to competency remains:  the fairness and 
accuracy of the criminal process require the lucid participation of the 
accused in his own defense.33 
All of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the right to 
competency has been in the context of adult criminal defendants.  Despite 
its unequivocal insistence that fairness dictates that incompetent defendants 
may not be tried, the Court has never addressed the question of whether 
juveniles are afforded that same due process right.  Likewise, the Oklahoma 
general competency statute does not explicitly address whether it applies to 
juveniles.  Oklahoma, however, flatly rejected the right to competency in 
juvenile proceedings in the 1989 case of G.J.I. v. Oklahoma.34   
Thirteen-year-old G.J.I. claimed that he was incompetent to aid his 
defense attorney at his delinquency hearing for attempted second degree 
rape and that he was entitled to a competency hearing.35  The Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals endorsed the trial court’s view that the state’s 
general competency statutes simply are not applicable to juvenile 
proceedings.  Despite the fact that G.J.I. had a “demonstrable mental 
illness,” a low I.Q., and suffered from major depression and conduct 
disorder of adolescence, the court held that it was neither appropriate nor 
                                                                                                                 
 31. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 175 (“A determination of competence or 
incompetence is functional in nature, context-dependent and pragmatic in orientation, and 
should be viewed as such by both courts and mental health and mental retardation 
professionals.”). 
 32. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398-401 (1993). 
 33. Of course, rationales other than fairness support the right to competency, such as 
maintaining the dignity and decorum of the criminal justice system by not having 
incompetent defendants disrupt the proceedings.  In addition, several justifications for 
punishment of offenders are weakened if punishment is inflicted on those who cannot 
comprehend why they are being punished.  There is little in the way of specific deterrence or 
retribution if a defendant does not understand what is happening to him and why.  While 
these other valid justifications support a right to competency, the primary significance of 
competence is the key role it plays in ensuring a fair trial.  See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 
27, at 170. 
 34. 778 P.2d 485 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).  
 35. Id. at 487.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
48 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:41 
 
 
necessary to extend the protections of the competency statutes to his jury 
trial, where he was found delinquent.36  The court based its reasoning on the 
nature of the juvenile proceedings, which it characterized as “specifically 
not criminal” and “directed towards rehabilitation.”37  Because G.J.I’s 
mental disorders were considered by the court and presumably would be a 
factor in his disposition plan, the court found the juvenile procedures were 
“a comprehensive substitute for the competency statutes.”38 
Oklahoma is the only state to reject explicitly the doctrine of adjudicative 
competence in juvenile court.39  If the rationale of G.J.I. continues to hold 
true, that the nature of juvenile proceedings inherently considers issues of 
competence in adjudicating and treating juveniles, then Oklahoma’s outlier 
position is of no concern.  But, as the only state to reject explicitly the right 
in juvenile adjudications, it is reasonable to reexamine the Oklahoma 
approach to juvenile competency in the face of the overwhelming 
consensus of virtually every other state, particularly in light of the three 
trends that have been shaping the evolution of the modern juvenile system 
and persuading most states to develop policies on juvenile competence. 
Those trends include the due process revolution in the juvenile court, the 
increasing punitive and adversarial nature of juvenile proceedings, and a 
growing scientific understanding of adolescent brain development. 
II. The Evolving Juvenile Court 
The concept of the juvenile court as a separate legal institution is only a 
little over a century old.40  First established in Chicago in 1899, the separate 
juvenile court concept spread rapidly across the United States so that by the 
early 1940s, all states had enacted legislation establishing separate courts 
for juvenile offenders.41  Based on the notion that juveniles are 
developmentally different than adults and more amenable to treatment and 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 486.  
 37. Id. at 487.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Redding & Frost, supra note 7, at 372.   
 40. For a general description of the history of juvenile courts in the United States, see 
COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, A CELEBRATION OR A WAKE? THE JUVENILE COURT AFTER 100 
YEARS:  1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1998). 
 41. See H. Warren Dunham, The Juvenile Court: Contradictory Orientations in 
Processing Offenders, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 508, 508-09 (1958).  Connecticut and 
Wyoming were the final two states to establish juvenile courts; all other states had followed 
Illinois's lead by 1923.  Id. at 509. 
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rehabilitation, juvenile courts embodied a parens patriae philosophy.42  
Juvenile courts were to act as a benevolent parent in the best interests of the 
child and the central tenets guiding the court were protection, treatment, 
and rehabilitation rather than punishment and retribution.  The juvenile 
court judge was envisioned as a father figure, putting his arm around the 
child and “draw[ing] the lad to him” in order to intervene and save the child 
from a life of crime.43  The jurisdiction of the juvenile court included all 
youth in need of intervention from the state, including abused or neglected 
children in need of protection and supervision.44  As a result, young 
offenders were treated using the same informal, discretionary, and 
essentially diagnostic procedures used in those cases, where a child’s best 
interests, background, and welfare dictated the disposition.  Thus, 
proceedings involving juvenile offenders were described as civil rather than 
criminal; constitutional requirements restricting state action when an 
individual's liberty was at stake were considered irrelevant.45   
Issues of juvenile competency had little relevancy in the traditional 
juvenile court system where informal proceedings were designed to take 
into account a juvenile’s immaturity and incompetence to reach a 
rehabilitative result.  The need for a juvenile competency right, however, 
has emerged with the modern evolution of juvenile courts.  Three 
significant changes have fueled this evolution and resulted in the increased 
salience of juvenile competence—the due process revolution, the increasing 
punitive nature of the system, and new scientific research on adolescent 
brain function and development. It is primarily these changes that have 
prompted a majority of states to establish a right to competency in juvenile 
proceedings.  
A. The Juvenile Due Process Revolution 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the concern 
that the actual performance of juvenile courts was failing to fulfill their 
                                                                                                                 
 42. The Latin phrase, parens patriae, means "parent of his or her country," and is 
defined as "the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for 
themselves." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).  Justice Fortas explained in In 
re Gault that the Latin phrase "was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was 
used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting 
the property interests and the person of the child." 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 43. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107, 120 (1909). 
 44. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 
695 (1991).  
 45. Id.  
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original laudable purposes and stepped in to curb perceived shortcomings 
and abuses of this informal system.  Disturbed that “the child receives the 
worst of both worlds:  that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults 
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children,”46 
the Court ushered in an era of due process requirements for juveniles.  
Through a series of decisions, the Court transformed the informal, highly 
discretionary juvenile justice system into a more adversarial, formalized 
structure.   
The Court first addressed the serious deficiencies of the juvenile court in 
Kent v. United States:  
 While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose 
of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise 
serious questions as to whether actual performance measures 
well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the 
immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional 
guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence that 
some juvenile courts . . .  lack the personnel, facilities and 
techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State 
in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to children 
charged with law violation.  There is evidence, in fact, that there 
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of 
both worlds:  that he gets neither the protections accorded to 
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment 
postulated for children.47 
Sixteen year old Morris Kent, convicted of housebreaking and robbery in 
adult criminal court, raised a number of issues in his appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.48  The Court, however, addressed only the narrow issue of 
whether the waiver process, where the juvenile court waived jurisdiction 
and transferred Kent to adult criminal court, was fair.  Interpreting the 
Washington, D.C. statute at issue, the Court found the waiver process 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
 47. Id. at 555-56. 
 48. Id. at 552.  Kent raised a long list of grounds for reversal, including:  his detention 
and interrogation were unlawful; his parents were not notified of his arrest; he was deprived 
of his liberty for about a week without a determination of probable cause; he was 
interrogated by the police in the absence of counsel or a parent and without warning of his 
right to remain silent or advice as to his right to counsel; he was fingerprinted while 
unlawfully detained; and that the fingerprints were unlawfully used.  In addition, Kent cited 
a number of errors by the district court.  Id.  
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defective and that Kent was entitled to a hearing, access to social records or 
reports available to the juvenile court, and to a statement of reasons for the 
waiver and transfer decision.49  Although the Court declined to make a 
sweeping pronouncement on the constitutional reach of juvenile due 
process rights,50 it did hold “that the hearing must measure up to the 
essentials of due process and fair treatment.”51 
A year after Kent, the Court was more explicit on “the essentials of due 
process and fair treatment” in a watershed decision that has attained near 
iconic status in juvenile justice, In re Gault.  In Gault the Court again 
questioned the legitimacy and efficacy of the parens patriae rationale and 
noted “that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is 
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”52  Gerald Gault 
was a fifteen-year-old boy charged with making an obscene phone call to a 
female neighbor.53  He was convicted by an Arizona juvenile court and 
committed to a juvenile facility for an indeterminate time not to extend 
beyond his twenty-first birthday.54  An adult convicted of the same offense 
in criminal court would have faced a maximum of two months in jail or a 
fine of $5 to $50.55  Gault’s parents were not notified that he was in 
custody, the delinquent petition filed against him did not contain any factual 
allegations, and the only testimony against him at the adjudicatory hearing 
was given by a probation officer who had investigated the case and 
prepared the petition.56  The complaining witness did not testify, there was 
no record made of the proceeding, and Gault was not represented by an 
attorney at the hearing.57 
In finding that young Gault’s due process rights had been violated, 
Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, proclaimed that “it would be 
extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity 
and the exercise of care implied in the phrase ‘due process.’  Under our 
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 553-54. 
 50. “The Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit provide an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we 
go no further.”  Id. at 556. 
 51. Id. at 562. 
 52. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967). 
 53. Id. at 4.   
 54. Id. at 7-8.   
 55. Id. at 8-9.   
 56. Id. at 33-34.   
 57. Id. at 56.   
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court.”58  The Court reasoned that a proceeding alleging a violation of 
criminal law for which a juvenile may be committed to an institution is 
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution and, therefore, must be 
accompanied by similar due process guarantees.59  The due process rights 
extended to juveniles as a result of the Gault decision included written 
notice of the charges, right to counsel, right against self-incrimination, and 
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.  In subsequent cases, the 
Court also established that juveniles must be proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt60 and that juveniles enjoy the protections of the Double 
Jeopardy clause.61 
Although the Gault decision heralded a due process revolution for 
juveniles, the U.S. Supreme Court stopped shy of extending the full 
panoply of criminal procedural rights to juveniles.  The Court rejected, for 
instance, that the right to trial by jury in juvenile proceedings is 
constitutionally mandated62 and has upheld pretrial detention of juveniles 
prior to a probable cause hearing.63  Convinced that “the Constitution does 
not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles,”64 
the Court recognized that a juvenile proceeding is fundamentally different 
than an adult criminal trial.  Although there is no question that juveniles are 
entitled to “the essentials of due process and fair treatment,” the Court 
sought to balance the informality and flexibility that characterize juvenile 
proceedings with the mandated constitutional standard that the proceedings 
be fundamentally fair.65 
B. A More Punitive and Adversarial Juvenile System? 
The second dramatic change in the juvenile justice system came as a 
response to the increase in the rate of violent juvenile crime in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  A relatively constant rate for juvenile violent crime 
from the early 1970s to the late 1980s increased dramatically by 64% 
between 1988 and 1994.  At the same time the number of juveniles arrested 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 27-28. 
 59. Id. at 36. 
 60. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 61. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). 
 62. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).  Interestingly, Oklahoma has 
extended the right to a jury trial in juvenile adjudications by statute.  See 10A OKLA. STAT. § 
2-2-401 (2011). 
 63. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 283 (1984). 
 64. Id. at 263. 
 65. Id. at 288. 
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for murder more than doubled between the mid-1980s and 1993.66  Fueled 
by extensive media coverage of violent crimes by juveniles and mounting 
public concern over a perceived epidemic of violent juvenile crime,67 all but 
a few states instituted reforms which tended to treat juveniles more like 
adults with a corresponding shift in philosophy away from rehabilitation 
and towards punishment.68  This “get tough” on juvenile crime response 
from state legislatures sparked a period of intense legislative activity that 
began in the late 1980s and continued through the end of the 1990s.  
Despite a steady decline in juvenile crime and violence rates since the 1994 
peak, states have not sought to roll back the shift in focus.69 
Signaling a shift away from traditional notions of individualized 
dispositions based on the best interests of the juvenile, a significant number 
of states amended their juvenile code purpose statements during the 1990s.  
Typically, a traditional statement of legislative purpose attached to a 
juvenile code espouses an intent “to secure for each minor . . . such care and 
guidance . . . as will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical 
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community.”70  
Amendments to juvenile code purpose statements, however, replaced the 
goal of rehabilitation with punishment or accountability as the primary goal 
for the juvenile justice system, emphasizing, for instance, public safety, the 
seriousness of the offense, children’s obligations to society, and rendering 
appropriate punishment.71  By the end of the 1997 legislative session, a 
third of the states had redefined their juvenile court purpose clauses to 
emphasize public safety, certain sanctions, and/or offender accountability.72   
                                                                                                                 
 66. Patricia Torbet & Linda Szymanski, State Legislative Responses to Violent Juvenile 
Crime: 1996-97 Update, JUVENILE JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency 
Prevention, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 1998, at 2. 
 67. Although there was a spike in violent juvenile crime in the early 1990s, the juvenile 
crime rate actually peaked in 1993 and declined during the second half of that decade.  
Public alarm, and the resulting legislative reaction, was stimulated at least in part by the 
excessive hype of the media.  See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 
81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 807-08 (2003); see also COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, FALSE IMAGES:  
THE NEWS MEDIA AND JUVENILE CRIME:  1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1997). 
 68. Patrick Griffin, Sean Addie, Benjamin Adams & Kathy Firestine, Trying Juveniles 
as Adults:  An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting, NAT’L REP. SERIES BULL., 
Sept. 2011, at 1. 
 69. Id. at 9. 
 70. Feld, supra note 44, at 709 (citations omitted). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Torbet & Szymanski, supra note 66, at 9. 
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In addition to the symbolic change in purpose statements, more 
substantive reforms included changes designed to make it easier to 
prosecute juveniles in adult criminal court.  Legislatures in nearly every 
state revised their laws to lower the age at which a juvenile can be tried as 
an adult and broaden the range of felonies that can result in adult 
prosecution, shift decision-making authority from judges to prosecutors, 
and replace individualized discretion with automatic mechanisms.73  Other 
common reforms included adding the existence of a prior record as a factor 
in waiver to adult court, increasing the maximum age beyond the normal 
age of majority for juvenile commitment, revising traditional confidentiality 
provisions in favor of more open proceedings and records, and including 
victims of juvenile crime as “active participants” in the juvenile justice 
process.  The result of these changes to the traditional juvenile court 
jurisdiction has been an erosion of the boundary between the adult and 
juvenile systems.74   
C. Juvenile Brains Are Different 
A third variable raising the salience of juvenile competency issues is the 
growing scientific understanding of the differences between adolescent and 
adult brain function.  New research has disproven the long-held assumption 
that brain development is complete by puberty.  Rather, neurologists have 
found that adolescence is a critical time for brain development, with 
dramatic changes to the brain’s structure and function.75   
Utilizing relatively new imaging technology, magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI), scientists have been able to track the changes in individual 
brains as they mature.76  These longitudinal neuroimaging studies have 
given scientists new insights into the patterns of teenage brain development 
and revealed that remarkable changes occur in the brain during the teen 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Griffin et al., supra note 68, at 1, 9. 
 74. For a comprehensive analysis of the trends in the states’ responses to the escalating 
serious crimes by juveniles in the 1990s, see PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME (1996). 
 75. See generally NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, PUB. NO. 11-4929, THE TEEN BRAIN: 
STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION (2011), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/public 
cations/the-teen-brain-still-under-construction/complete-index.shtml. 
 76. See, e.g., Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and 
Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999), available at 
http://www.math.tau.ac.il/~dms/Longitudinal/brain_MRI.pdf. 
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years.77  These enormous changes impact the way adolescents process and 
react to information and, as a result, teenagers are more likely to be short-
sighted, have poor impulse control, be driven by emotions, and be 
susceptible to peer pressure.  These factors reduce adolescents’ ability to 
make rational decisions about their actions and contribute to poor decision-
making.78 
In a series of recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court relied upon, at least in 
part, this newly understood neuroscientific distinction between adult and 
adolescent brains in reminding us that “children cannot be viewed simply as 
miniature adults.”79  This distinction led the Court to abolish the juvenile 
death penalty,80 both juvenile sentences of life without the possibility of 
parole for non-homicide crimes81 and mandatory life without parole for 
homicide,82 and to rule that the Miranda custody test must include a child’s 
age in its analysis.83 
The Court has repeatedly acknowledged the growing scientific evidence 
that young brains are simply not fully mature in their judgment, problem-
solving, and decision-making capabilities.  In finding that the death penalty 
is not appropriate for youth under age eighteen in Roper v. Simmons, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy noted that scientific and sociological studies have 
confirmed significant differences between adults and juveniles in maturity, 
responsibility, and other traits.84  The Court was explicit in its reliance on 
developmental research, citing studies referenced in amicus briefs of both 
the American Medical Association and the American Psychological and 
Psychiatric Associations.   
Writing again for the majority in Graham v. Florida, which struck down 
juvenile life without parole sentences, Justice Kennedy was even more 
explicit about scientific findings on adolescent brain development.  
                                                                                                                 
 77. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, PUB. NO. 01-4929, TEENAGE BRAIN:  A WORK IN 
PROGRESS (2008), available at http://wwwapps.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/teenage-
brain-a-work-in-progress.shtml.  
 78. For a summary of the scientific research on adolescent brain development and the 
possible implications for the juvenile justice system, see ACTION FOR CHILDREN OF N.C., 
PUTTING THE JUVENILE BACK IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (2007), available at http://www.ncchild. 
org/sites/default/files/Juvenile_Justice_Raising_The_Age_Brief_final.pdf. 
 79. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011) (citing Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). 
 80. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 81. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 82. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (U.S. 2012). 
 83. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399. 
 84. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
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Kennedy reiterated the developmental research cited in Roper and noted the 
recent neuroscientific research findings on the continuing development of 
adolescent brains:  “[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science 
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult 
minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control 
continue to mature through late adolescence.”85 
Justice Sotomayor grounded the Court’s juvenile Miranda decision in 
the “commonsense” of the differences between children and adults and the 
Court’s longstanding recognition of those distinctions.86  In concluding that 
age is both a relevant and an objective circumstance that must be included 
in the Miranda custody analysis, the Court noted that scientific research 
“confirms what experience bears out.”87   
Writing for the Court in Miller v. Alabama, Justice Elana Kagan not only 
echoed the same scientific refrain, but asserted that “[t]he evidence . . .  
indicates that the science and social science supporting Roper’s and 
Graham’s conclusions have become even stronger.”88  Justice Kagan 
actually referred to the “incompetencies associated with youth” in 
explaining why chronological age must be a consideration in sentencing 
juveniles convicted of homicide offenses.89  The Court’s holding that 
mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles violates the Eight 
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment rests in part, once 
again, on the neuroscientific distinction between adult and adolescent 
brains. 
The Court’s refusal to ignore age in these four recent juvenile cases and 
its acknowledgement of and reliance upon the scientific evidence of 
adolescent brain research may have “opened the door to a broader 
examination of age in other contexts, with potentially far-reaching 
implications for children involved in the justice system.”90  Based on these 
decisions, the Court may be open to considering the most recent scientific 
studies on how adolescent brain development impacts adjudicative 
competency.  Indeed, Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller explicitly 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Brief for the American Medical Ass’n et al. as 
Amici Curiae at 16-24, Graham (No. 08-7412); Brief for American Psychological Ass’n et 
al. as Amici Curiae at 22-27, Graham)). 
 86. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 n.5. 
 87. Id. at 2403 n.5. 
 88. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465, n.5 (U.S. 2012). 
 89. Id. at 2468. 
 90. Marsha Levick, J.D.B. v. North Carolina:  The U.S. Supreme Court Heralds the 
Emergence of the ‘Reasonable Juvenile’ in American Criminal Law, 89 CRIM. L. RPTR. 753 
(2011). 
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references a juvenile’s incapacity to assist his own attorneys as one of the 
“incompetencies associated with youth.”91 
Building on the new scientific understanding of brain development, the 
MacArthur Juvenile Competence Study92 was the first large scale study to 
explore how these brain differences affect juvenile competency to stand 
trial.  The study was designed to examine three basic questions:  1) whether 
adolescents differ from adults in their abilities to participate in the 
adjudicative process; 2) if so, in what types of youths are these differences 
most apparent; and, 3) what kinds of deficits have implications for law 
policy and practice?93  The study included a diverse group of 1400 
participants ages eleven to twenty-four, both males and females, half in jail 
or juvenile detention and half from the general population with a range of 
cultural, ethnic, and socioeconomic characteristics.94  The study also 
tracked data on other variables such as “experience with the justice system, 
intelligence, and mental health problems.”95   
Using hypotheticals designed to evaluate a variety of abilities associated 
with competence, the study assessed “three key aspects of psychosocial 
maturity:  the ability to evaluate risk, to think about future consequences, 
and to resist peer pressure”.96  Researchers used participant responses to a 
series of decisions “to assess how immaturity affects the choices defendants 
make”.97  In addition, study participants were evaluated with an established 
instrument widely “used with adults to assess their functional abilities 
related to competence,” the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – 
Criminal Adjudication.98  “Adults who score low [on this instrument] are 
generally impaired by mental illness or retardation.”99 
The findings of the study are startling.  The results “strongly suggest that 
about one-third of 11-to 13-year-olds and one-fifth of 14- to 15-year-olds 
probably are not competent to stand trial.”100  The study found that many 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
 92. Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial:  A Comparison of 
Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 
(2003) [hereinafter MacArthur Study]. 
 93. Id. at 336. 
 94. Id. at 337.   
 95. Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial MacArthur Foundation Study Calls 
Competency into Question, 18 CRIM. JUST. 20, 22-23 (2003). 
 96. Id. at 22.   
 97. Id.   
 98. Id.   
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adolescents lack the capacities needed to be a competent defendant, 
exhibiting significant deficits in knowledge and understanding of the 
judicial process, an inability “to put facts together and draw logical 
conclusions, and less able than adults to think about the future 
consequences of their decisions.”101  “In matters [related to trial 
understanding] and reasoning about important information, 30 percent of 
those 11 to 13 years old, and 19 percent of those ages 14 and 15, performed 
at the level of mentally ill adults who have been found not competent to 
stand trial.”102  These findings were “robust” across gender, ethnicity, and 
socioeconomic status variables, as well as among both those currently in 
juvenile detention and those in the general community.103  Thus, even 
setting aside the more traditional issues of juvenile mental illness and 
mental retardation, which current research also suggests are likely 
significant and undoubtedly affect competence,104 policymakers and state 
legislators must grapple with developmental immaturity as a relevant factor 
for assessing juvenile competence.105 
III. Where Does That Leave Oklahoma Juveniles? 
Oklahoma has not been immune to the trends sweeping the juvenile 
justice system and propelling the near universal move toward a right to 
juvenile competency across the nation.  Questions remain, however, as to 
whether the impact of those trends on the juvenile justice system in 
Oklahoma reaffirms or undermines the state’s refusal to recognize a 
juvenile right of adjudicative competency.  To answer those questions we 
must examine the different ways that the state of Oklahoma treats a juvenile 
under the juvenile code and the manner in which issues of juvenile 
competency are addressed under each approach.  This section will examine 
each of those ways in order to assess whether Oklahoma’s approach to 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id.   
 102. See id. at 22-23.  
 103. MacArthur Study, supra note 92, at 346. 
 104. See David R. Katner, The Mental Health Paradigm and the MacArthur Study:  
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juvenile competency meets the U.S. Supreme Court’s due process standard 
of “fundamental fairness” for juvenile proceedings.106   
When a child under eighteen years old commits a crime in Oklahoma, 
the state can treat that individual in three different ways depending on the 
age of the child and the seriousness of the offense.  Although the default 
standard for a child under the age of eighteen is juvenile adjudication,107 
Oklahoma’s Juvenile Code also provides for prosecuting and sentencing 
children as adults108 or as youthful offenders,109 a status designed to avail 
the juvenile of the rehabilitative services of the juvenile system, but where 
an adult sentence is possible.   
A. Competency in Juvenile Adjudications 
Of the three trends shaping the modern juvenile justice system—a more 
punitive and adversarial system, expanded due process rights, and new 
understanding of the adolescent brain—at least one of those trends is 
consistent with Oklahoma’s approach to competency in juvenile 
adjudications.  The latest scientific research on adolescent brain 
development actually reconfirms the core rationale for a separate juvenile 
system, specifically that children and young adults are developmentally 
different than adults and should be treated so under the law.  Hard science 
now reaffirms the historic justification for juvenile rehabilitation over 
punishment as the focus of juvenile dispositions.  The highly elastic and 
malleable adolescent brain may leave young people more vulnerable to 
negative influences and compromise rational decision-making but it also 
provides a window of opportunity where appropriate guidance and support 
will help them become responsible members of society.  The very nature of 
separate juvenile proceedings, just as the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals held in G.J.I., is designed to account for this developmental 
distinction from adults.   
If the Oklahoma juvenile system has truly remained rehabilitative rather 
than become punitive like the adult criminal system, the MacArthur Study 
findings may be irrelevant to juveniles who remain in juvenile court. The 
MacArthur conclusion that a significant number of juveniles are likely 
incompetent to participate in their own trials because of developmental 
immaturity does not invalidate a system that takes into account a juvenile’s 
immaturity and incompetence and constructs an individualized plan to 
                                                                                                                 
 106. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). 
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reach a rehabilitative result.  The relevance of these findings on juvenile 
competence for juveniles who remain in the juvenile court, then, turns on 
how much those proceedings resemble a criminal trial and impose 
punishment in the form of adult-like consequences.  Not surprisingly, the 
picture is mixed. 
The purpose clause of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code is the first indication 
of this mixed picture.  Unlike a number of states that amended their purpose 
clauses to embrace punishment and accountability over rehabilitation, 
Oklahoma’s statute does not explicitly reference punishment as a goal.  
Although the purpose of the juvenile code is to “promote the public safety 
and reduce juvenile delinquency,” the means listed to accomplish this goal 
focus on “the unique characteristics and needs of juveniles . . . 
rehabilitation and reintegration . . . [and providing] access to opportunities 
for personal and social growth.”110  There are, of course, multiple references 
to developing responsibility and protecting the public, but there is no 
wholesale abandonment of rehabilitation for punishment. 
In addition, many of the traditional features of a rehabilitative focused 
juvenile system remain, with the state acting as parens patriae.  The 
juvenile court is required to craft an individualized treatment plan that 
identifies the conditions leading to the adjudication, the specific services to 
remedy the conditions, and “the services to be provided to the 
parent . . . .”111  When a child is removed from the home, a treatment plan 
must detail the reason for the placement, the services to be provided, and 
the services necessary to transition a child back to the community.112  A 
decision to leave a child in the home must be “consistent with the welfare 
of the child” and the court also has authority over a parent to require certain 
conduct.113  Commitments to the custody of the Office of Juvenile Affairs 
are for an indeterminate period,114 and any placement outside the home 
requires a court determination that “in accordance with the best interests of 
the child and protection of the public” reasonable efforts were made to 
provide for the return the child to the family.115  All these dispositional 
orders are required to be reviewed periodically by the court “until such time 
as the conditions which caused the child to be adjudicated have been 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. § 2-1-102. 
 111. Id. § 2-2-502(A)(1)-(5). 
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corrected,”116 with each review focusing on the services being provided to 
the child and directing additional services to be provided “to protect the 
child from further physical, mental or emotional harm or to correct the 
conditions that led to the adjudication.” 117 Presumably, the court considers 
elements of competency, such as maturity, mental illness, and functional 
ability to assist counsel in presenting the facts, in determining an 
appropriate individualized treatment plan for the juvenile. 
While the Oklahoma juvenile system remains individualized and focused 
on rehabilitation at its heart, nevertheless, juvenile adjudications 
increasingly resemble criminal convictions because of their serious 
consequences, both direct and collateral.  At the outset, a juvenile 
adjudication can result in a loss of liberty:  the juvenile can be made a ward 
of the state, be placed on probation, be required to undergo counseling, be 
removed from home and placed in the custody of a private institution or 
group home, or placed in the custody of the Office of Juvenile Affairs for 
an indeterminate period of time.118  As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
in Gault:  “A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found 
to be ‘delinquent’ and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is 
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.” 119  Even rehabilitation 
sanctions can involve a major loss of a child’s liberty. 
A juvenile’s loss of liberty may be an incidental cost of a rehabilitative 
disposition, but other serious ramifications of a delinquency adjudication 
resemble a criminal conviction and may be motivated more by punishment 
(and perhaps public safety) than rehabilitation.  For instance, juvenile 
adjudications are predicates for the filing of adult felony charges,120 are 
used in certification determinations for youthful offender121 and adult122 
status, may require registration as a juvenile sex offender,123 or possible 
transfer from the juvenile sex offender registry to the adult sex offender 
registry.124  Juvenile records are no longer as private as they once were125 
and may be used to enhance future adult sentences.126  These serious 
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consequences are generally unrelated to the rehabilitative function of the 
juvenile process and suggest a more punitive result, thus raising issues of 
competency.  
In addition to the punitive consequences of juvenile adjudications, the 
state’s decades-long struggle to provide appropriate treatment in its juvenile 
facilities raises questions about the punitive nature of those facilities.  
Oklahoma has been subject to two consent decrees as a result of lawsuits 
challenging its treatment of juveniles.  The first consent decree was a result 
of a 1978 class action lawsuit, known as Terry D.,127 which alleged that 
children were subjected to abusive use of restraints, solitary confinement, 
and the use of tranquilizing drugs to control juveniles, rather than treat 
them.  In addition, children who had not committed any criminal act, such 
as status offenders and victims of neglect, were housed with those who had 
been adjudicated of crimes.128  The lawsuit resulted in a detailed 1984 
consent decree requiring the state to dramatically change its approach to 
confining juveniles, including a mandate to place children in state custody 
in the least restrictive alternative located near his/her home, limitations on 
the use of solitary confinement and a ban on confining any non-offender in 
an institution.129 
In 2006, the state was sued again in federal court, this time by the Justice 
Department, for reported problems at the L.E. Rader Center, such as 
physical assaults, suicide attempts, and sexual assaults within the juvenile 
detention center.130  Yet another consent decree was signed in September 
2008 and contained nearly 100 requirements to address problems of 
juvenile safety, suicide prevention, inappropriate sexual behavior, 
inappropriate use of restraints, mental-health services, and special 
education.131  Despite a last-minute emergency motion by the Justice 
Department to extend the decree due to “continued non-compliance” with 
the terms of the agreement, the consent decree expired in 2011.132  
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Although the era of consent decrees appears to be at an end, the state’s 
long history in failing to meet the rehabilitative needs of juveniles in the 
system is troubling.  There are also concerns that a number of new 
initiatives aimed at controlling a recent wave of violence in juvenile 
facilities, including the use of pepper spray, Tasers, restraints, and solitary 
confinement, reflect a move away from a rehabilitative model to a more 
punitive corrections model.133  Despite the traditional parens patriae 
features of Oklahoma’s juvenile code, where juvenile competency issues 
are accounted for through individualized dispositions and rehabilitation, it 
appears that children who remain in the juvenile system nevertheless are 
subject to an increasingly punitive system where competency may be a due 
process requirement.   
The juvenile due process expansion transformed juvenile proceedings in 
Oklahoma just as it did across the nation.  The rights flowing from Gault 
and its progeny are fundamental constitutional rights protected by both the 
federal Constitution and the Oklahoma state Constitution and recognized by 
our state and federal courts at all levels.134  In fact, Oklahoma has not only 
upheld and endorsed the due process protections recognized by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but has expanded those rights to include a right to trial by 
jury.135   
Although due process is a flexible concept which “calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands,”136 the U.S. 
Supreme Court has endorsed “fundamental fairness” as the applicable due 
process standard for juvenile proceedings.137  The due process rights 
accorded juveniles from Gault—notice, right to counsel, right against self-
                                                                                                                 
 133. Barbara Hoberock, Reforms on Juvenile Justice Centers Losing Ground, TULSA 
WORLD, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=336&article 
id=20111008_16_A1_CUTLIN247397. 
 134. For Oklahoma state cases and statutes recognizing the rights established in Gault, 
see for example, Crandell v. State, 539 P.2d 398,401 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) and 10A 
OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-107 (2011) (notice of charges); J.T.P. v. Oklahoma, 544 P.2d 1270, 
1276-77 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) and 10A OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-301(A), (C) (right to counsel); 
J.T.P., 544 P.2d at 1277-78 and 10A OKLA. STAT. §2-2-402(B) (right against self-
incrimination); D.M.H. v Oklahoma, 136 P.3d 1054, 1055 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) and 10A 
OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-402(C) (right to confrontation and cross examination); In re J.E.S., 585 
P.2d 382, 383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (right to beyond a reasonable doubt standard); and 
D.M.H., 136 P3d at 1056 and 10A OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-401 (right to a trial). 
 135. See 10A OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-401. 
 136. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
 137. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). 
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incrimination, right to confront witnesses—are thus fundamental to a fair 
proceeding.  In the context of adult criminal trials, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has made clear that competence is required to exercise the very rights that 
are fundamental to a fair juvenile proceeding:   
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the 
main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, 
including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to 
summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the 
right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without 
penalty for doing so.138  
If competence is a prerequisite to exercising essential adult trial rights, is 
competence also a prerequisite to exercising those same rights in a juvenile 
adjudication?  In other words, are the juvenile due process rights from 
Gault meaningless without competency?  Like the relevance of the 
scientific findings on juvenile brain development to a need for juvenile 
adjudicative competency, the answer to that question may also depend on 
how much a juvenile proceeding resembles an adult criminal trial and 
imposes adult-like consequences.  As we have seen, that picture is mixed, 
with a traditional parens patriae rehabilitative statutory scheme somewhat 
eroded by increasingly severe consequences and the state’s struggle to 
provide consistent rehabilitative services. 
As discussed above, whether juvenile brain science discoveries and 
expanded due process rights mandate a right to competency for juveniles in 
Oklahoma is dependent in part upon the extent to which the third trend in 
the evolution of juvenile justice, a more punitive model of juvenile justice, 
has impacted the nature of juvenile proceedings in the state and 
overshadowed the rehabilitative model.  For youth who remain subject to 
traditional juvenile adjudication, where dispositions still result in an 
individualized treatment plan geared to the best interest of the child,139 
competency issues arise less from the proceeding and disposition itself and 
more from the consequences of being adjudicated delinquent.  That results 
in a somewhat mixed picture for juveniles who remain in juvenile court for 
adjudication.  Consistent with the more punitive trend, however, Oklahoma 
has crafted policies that subject more juveniles to adult proceedings and 
sanctions, where competency issues are undeniably relevant and only 
partially addressed.  For those children prosecuted or sentenced as adults or 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 
127, 139-40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 139. 10A OKLA. STAT. §§ 2-2-501 to 2-2-504. 
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youthful offenders, punishment replaces individualized rehabilitative 
dispositions and transforms a juvenile proceeding into a criminal one 
requiring all the due process protections to which a criminal defendant is 
entitled, including competency to stand trial.  In short, the rationale that the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon in refusing to recognize a 
juvenile competency right in G.J.I.—that the proceedings were 
“specifically not criminal” and “directed towards rehabilitation”—simply 
does not apply when children are prosecuted and sentenced in adult 
criminal court. 
B. Children Prosecuted and Sentenced as Adults 
In Oklahoma, a child of any age who is charged with an act which would 
be a felony if committed by an adult may be certified as an adult and treated 
as an adult in every way by the criminal justice system,140 including being 
incarcerated with adults upon conviction.141  More specific provisions of the 
Juvenile Code require that a child as young as thirteen charged with first 
degree murder “shall be held accountable for the act as if the person were 
an adult,”142 unless the court “reverse” certifies the child as a youthful 
offender or a juvenile.  These certification decisions, either to prosecute a 
child of any age on a felony charge in adult court or, conversely, to return a 
thirteen- or fourteen-year-old accused of first degree murder from adult to 
juvenile court, require the court to conduct a hearing and make findings 
based on a list of statutory factors supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.143  However, youths who are fifteen to seventeen years old and 
charged with first degree murder must be treated as adults, with no option to 
convince a judge to certify the child as a youthful offender or juvenile.144  
In addition, Oklahoma has a once-an-adult-always-an-adult provision such 
that once a child has been certified to stand trial as an adult or for the 
imposition of an adult sentence, that child will always be treated as an adult 
and will not be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction for any future 
proceedings.145 
Under the Youthful Offender Act, juveniles as young as fifteen may be 
subject to adult sentences through another certification process or if the 
juvenile fails to comply with the treatment plan ordered by the court or 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. § 2-2-403. 
 141. Id. § 2-5-204(F). 
 142. Id. § 2-5-205(A). 
 143. Id. §§ 2-2-403, 2-2-205. 
 144. Id. § 2-5-205(B). 
 145. Id. § 2-5-204(G). 
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engages in other prohibited behavior.146  Oklahoma’s Youthful Offender 
Act has provided a blended sentencing option between the criminal and 
juvenile courts since 1998.147  The Act, which elevates public safety and 
accountability over rehabilitation in dealing with juveniles who commit 
more serious crimes,148 is applicable to juveniles fifteen to seventeen years 
old who are charged with a statutory list of serious felonies.149  Oklahoma 
criminal courts have jurisdiction over children charged as youthful 
offenders and the prosecution proceeds exactly the same as it would in adult 
criminal court.150  Convicted youthful offenders are subject to the same type 
of sentencing procedures and duration of sentence as an adult convicted of a 
felony offense.  The distinction is that unless the child has been certified for 
an adult sentence, a youthful offender sentence is served in the custody or 
under the supervision of the Office of Juvenile Affairs, where the youth 
may still receive appropriate rehabilitation services.151  The Office of 
Juvenile Affairs prepares a rehabilitation plan for the child, identifying the 
goals along with the programs and services to be provided to meet those 
objectives.152  The court periodically reviews the progress of the youthful 
offender and may, based on additional offenses, bad behavior, or failure to 
follow the rehabilitative plan, transfer him to the custody of the Department 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. § 2-5-208. 
 147. Id. § 2-5-201. 
 148. Id. § 2-5-202(B). 
 149. Fifteen to seventeen year olds are held accountable as youthful offenders for:  1) 
Murder in the second degree; 2) Kidnapping; 3) Manslaughter in the first degree; 4) Robbery 
with a dangerous weapon or a firearm or attempt thereof; 5) Robbery in the first degree or 
attempt thereof; 6) Rape in the first degree or attempt thereof; 7) Rape by instrumentation or 
attempt thereof; 8) Forcible sodomy; 9) Lewd molestation; 10) Arson in the first degree or 
attempt thereof; or 11) Any offense in violation of Section 652 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes. Id. § 2-5-206(A). 
 Sixteen and seventeen year-olds are held accountable as youthful offenders for:  1) 
Burglary in the first degree or attempted burglary in the first degree; 2) Battery or assault 
and battery on a state employee or contractor while in the custody or supervision of the 
Office of Juvenile Affairs; 3)Aggravated assault and battery of a police officer; 4) 
Intimidating a witness; 5) Trafficking in or manufacturing illegal drugs; 6) Assault or assault 
and battery with a deadly weapon; 7) Maiming; 8) Residential burglary in the second degree 
after certain prior offenses; 9) Rape in the second degree; or 10) Use of a firearm while in 
commission of a felony.  Id. § 2-5-206(B). 
 150. Id. § 2-5-204. 
 151. Id. § 2-5-209. 
 152. Id. § 2-5-210. 
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of Corrections to complete his sentence in adult prison.153  In essence, a 
youthful offender is tried as an adult and given an adult criminal sentence 
that is deferred as long as he takes advantage of the rehabilitative services 
provided in the juvenile system.  A court order transferring a youthful 
offender to the custody of the Department of Corrections is deemed an adult 
conviction with all the ramifications of such. 
These provisions reflect the national trend of a more punitive juvenile 
system and raise questions of juvenile competency to stand trial for those 
Oklahoma youths prosecuted or sentenced in adult criminal court.  Even if 
you accept G.J.I.’s contention that issues of competency are adequately 
accounted for in the juvenile system, despite the fact that consequences 
have become markedly more punitive and rehabilitation harder to come by, 
juveniles remain vulnerable to due process competency violations in the 
context of adult treatment and in the certification process itself. 
C. Competency for Juveniles in Adult Criminal Court 
Of course, once a juvenile is certified to stand trial as an adult or as a 
youthful offender, the child has all the statutory and constitutional rights 
and protections of an adult accused of a crime,154 including the right to 
competency.  What remains uncertain in Oklahoma is whether a juvenile’s 
developmental immaturity and resulting lack of capacity to assist 
effectively in her defense would render her incompetent to stand trial under 
either the Dusky/Drope standard or the state competency statute.  Given the 
conclusions of the MacArthur Study regarding the significant numbers of 
juveniles whose adjudicative capabilities mirror mentally ill adults who 
have been found incompetent to stand trial,155 this question is worthy of an 
answer. 
While a majority of states have extended the right of adjudicative 
competency to juveniles, states are split on whether developmental 
immaturity alone is a legitimate source of incompetence.156  Most states use 
the Dusky/Drope functional standard to assess juvenile competency, but 
some states require that the incompetence come from mental illness or 
                                                                                                                 
 153. The court must also decide whether to transfer a youthful offender to adult prison 
once he or she reaches the age of 18, when the Office of Juvenile Affairs no longer has 
jurisdiction over the individual.  See id. § 2-5-209. 
 154. Id. § 2-5-204(C). 
 155. See MacArthur Study, supra note 92, at 346. 
 156. Twila A. Wingrove, Is Immaturity a Legitimate Source of Incompetence to Avoid 
Standing Trial in Juvenile Court?, 86 NEB. L. REV. 488, 506 (2007).  
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mental retardation rather than immaturity alone.157  Only a few states 
explicitly allow for developmental immaturity to serve as a component in 
juvenile competency determinations.  For example, the Iowa Court of 
Appeals stated:   
Limiting incompetency in delinquency proceedings to cases in 
which the child is incompetent by reason of a “mental disorder” 
would fail to recognize that a juveniles’ inability to appreciate 
the charge, understand the proceedings, or assist effectively in 
the defense may be the result of immaturity, lack of intellectual 
capacity, or both. We conclude that limiting determinations of 
incompetency in juvenile cases to those cases in which the 
inability to appreciate, understand, and assist is based on a 
“mental disorder” would offend rights to due process.158  
Similarly, at least three other states have identified immaturity as a 
legitimate source of incompetence for juveniles either through statute or 
case law.159 
Oklahoma’s competency standard, like the ABA Criminal Justice Mental 
Health Standards, does not tie incompetence to mental illness but rather, 
“[t]he test . . .  is whether the accused has sufficient ability to consult with 
his lawyer and has a rational as well as actual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.”160  Under that standard, competency assessments 
for juveniles facing criminal court in Oklahoma should factor in the 
developmental features and unique maturity issues that can adversely affect 
a child’s ability to assist in her defense.  The Dusky/Drope competence 
standard established by the Supreme Court and embraced by Oklahoma’s 
competency statute and case law is a functional test; therefore, it should 
make no difference whether the source of the defendant’s inability to 
function is mental illness or immaturity.  In short, in order to ensure due 
process for children prosecuted or sentenced in adult criminal court, 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Douglass Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric 
Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S52 (Supp. 
2005); see, e.g., Washington v. Swenson-Tucker, No. 32944-7-II, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 
242 at *13 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2006) (upholding a finding of competence for an eight-
year-old because his “limitations are the result of developmental deficits, not mental disease 
or defect”). 
 158. In re A.B., No. 05-0868, 715 N.W.2d 767 (Table), 2006 WL 469945 at *3 (Iowa 
App., Mar. 1, 2006). 
 159. See Wingrove, supra note 156, at 508 (identifying Florida, Michigan and Ohio as 
recognizing that immaturity may impact competency). 
 160. Bryson v. State, 876 P.2d 240, 249 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (citation omitted). 
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Oklahoma courts should apply a competency standard to juveniles that 
takes into consideration their unique development and maturity issues. 
The loudest criticism of this approach is that children who commit 
serious crimes simply would not be held accountable for their criminal 
actions.  If a sizeable proportion of younger adolescents are unfit to stand 
trial, what would the state do with them after certifying them to adult 
criminal court but declaring them incompetent to proceed?  Adult 
defendants who are found incompetent to stand trial may not be held 
indefinitely for treatment to restore competency.161  There must be a 
prospect for the defendant’s successful restoration within a reasonable time 
and “his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that 
goal.”162  The same would be true for children, but courts would certainly 
be reluctant to detain immature adolescents long enough for them to grow 
up and gain competency.  The simple answer is to send incompetent youths 
back to juvenile court where their immaturity is better accounted for and 
rehabilitative services are more likely available.   
Advocates for harsher youth sentences, who have argued that “adult time 
for adult crime” serves as a strong deterrent and is an effective response to 
more serious and often violent juvenile crime, would balk at sending 
serious young offenders back to juvenile court based on maturity-based 
incompetence.  But recent research shows that prosecuting youths in the 
adult system is ineffective and actually may lead to more crime, not less.  
According to both the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, youths who are 
transferred from the juvenile court system to the adult criminal system are 
approximately 34% more likely than youths retained in the juvenile court 
system to be rearrested for violent or other crime.163  Researchers with the 
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and 
Juvenile Justice reported similar findings from a study of more than 2000 
New York and New Jersey juveniles, drawn from two jurisdictions with 
dramatically different approaches to handling juvenile offenders.  The study 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Robert Hanh et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the 
Transfer of Youth from the Juvenile to the Adult Justice System:  A Report on 
Recommendations of the Task Force on Community Preventative Services, MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Nov. 30, 2007, at 6; Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer 
Laws:  An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, JUVENILE JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile 
Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Wash., D.C.), June 2010, available at http://nicic.gov/ 
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concluded that “results suggest that harsher sentences and adult punishment 
are ineffective deterrents to crime among the juveniles in this sample.”164  
In addition, a recent Baltimore, Maryland study found that, among other 
things, the adult justice system teaches teens to become violent criminals, 
subjects them to sexual and physical abuse, wastes taxpayer money, and 
unfairly targets African Americans.165  
These findings are not particularly surprising.  There are limited services 
in the adult system and youth often become socialized into a violent 
institutional culture where adult criminals are the role models.166  Returning 
incompetent youths to juvenile court would save money in the long run by 
decreasing reoffending and increasing the odds that youth offenders will be 
rehabilitated in the juvenile system and become productive members of 
society.167  Implementing a competency standard for juveniles in adult court 
that considers developmental immaturity as a factor is the first step to 
correcting these unintended consequences of juvenile transfer and 
protecting the due process rights of juveniles in adult court.  The second 
area requiring action on juvenile competency is in the certification process 
itself. 
D. Competency in the Certification Process 
The certification process itself—where a court determines whether a 
child will be tried as an adult or a youthful offender or subject to an adult 
sentence—raises a more troubling competency concern.  The consequences 
of being certified as an adult or a youthful offender and subject to an adult 
sentence are obviously significant and potentially severe.  Nevertheless, a 
child has no right to be competent to participate in the certification process 
that may ultimately result in an adult criminal trial or sentence.  The 
decisions that juveniles have to make with their attorney in a certification 
hearing are no less complex than in a criminal trial and certainly require 
that the juvenile be able to effectively and rationally assist their attorney.  If 
the central rationale that animates the right to competency is fairness, is it 
                                                                                                                 
 164. MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE 
ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 1 (Issue Brief 5, n.d.). 
 165. See Tricia Bishop, Report Says Trying Juveniles as Adults is Counterproductive, 
BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 4, 2010, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-10-04/news/bs-md-
just-kids-partnership-20101004_1_juvenile-system-baltimore-jail-juvenile-court. 
 166. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES 7-8 (2007). 
 167. MICHELLE DEITCH ET AL., FROM TIME OUT TO HARD TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN THE 
ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 64 (2009). 
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fair to certify a juvenile to the adult court if she is incompetent to provide 
assistance to her attorney in the hearing that makes that determination?   
It is true that the court is bound to consider something akin to 
competency in making some certification decisions, even though the 
juvenile need not be competent to participate in the certification hearing 
itself.  Among the statutory factors that the court is required to consider in 
order to certify a juvenile as an adult168 or youthful offender169 or impose an 
adult sentence170 is an assessment of the sophistication and maturity of the 
accused and their capability of distinguishing right from wrong.  Typically, 
the court has the benefit of a psychological evaluation as part of the 
investigation that accompanies such a motion, but that does not address the 
problem of a juvenile being competent enough to assist counsel in the 
hearing itself, which could lead to a significant deprivation of liberty.  
Competence is not always a factor in the decision to prosecute a child in 
adult court, however.  Where there is a statutory mandate that a youth who 
commits certain serious crimes will be treated as an adult, the factors the 
court may consider in a “reverse certification” back to the juvenile court or 
to youthful offender status do not include developmental immaturity or 
other aspects of adjudicative competency.171  The only factors the court may 
weigh in deciding to remove the youth from adult court include the manner 
in which the alleged offense was committed, whether the offense was 
against persons or property, the record and past history of the child, and the 
prospects for adequate protection of the public.172  For instance, a thirteen-
year-old charged with first degree murder must be tried in adult court.  
Although he could petition the court to certify him as a child and return the 
matter to juvenile court jurisdiction, there is no provision for the court to 
consider his competency to assist his lawyer in his defense or to understand 
the proceedings against him in making that determination.  In fact, the 
statutory language seems to suggest the court is precluded from considering 
competency at all in that situation.173   
The Supreme Court has held that a proceeding that results in waiver to 
adult court is a “critically important” stage in the juvenile court process and 
must be accompanied by minimum requirements of due process and fair 
                                                                                                                 
 168. 10A OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-403(A)(3) (2011). 
 169. Id. § 2-5-205(E)(4). 
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 171. Id. § 2-5-101(E). 
 172. Id. 
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treatment.174  Given the grave consequences of adult criminal court, those 
minimum due process protections should include an assessment of 
competency prior to proceeding with a certification hearing of any kind.  
Even though Oklahoma’s competency statute does not explicitly mention 
juveniles, it does apply to every stage of a criminal proceeding after arrest 
and before judgment including but not limited to, interrogation, lineup, 
preliminary hearing, motion dockets, discovery, pretrial hearings, and 
trial.175  A certification hearing certainly is implied in that list.  
IV. Conclusion 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the right to be competent to stand 
trial is a fundamental right essential to fairness and due process about which 
there is no question.176  The significance of the right is the key role it plays 
in ensuring a fair and accurate trial.  The trends shaping the modern 
juvenile justice system—the expansion of juvenile due process rights, the 
punitive juvenile justice reforms, and the growing understanding of the 
unique features of the adolescent brain—have propelled other states to 
acknowledge a right of competency in juvenile proceedings.  In the twenty-
two years since the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected that right 
as unnecessary, those trends have changed the landscape of juvenile justice 
in Oklahoma enough to warrant a second look at our outlier position on 
juvenile competency.  
Even if we accept the assertion that Oklahoma’s juvenile system remains 
true to its parens patriae foundations, with a judge acting as a benevolent 
parent in the best interests of the child to meet individualized, rehabilitative 
goals, it is reasonable to reexamine the Oklahoma approach to juvenile 
competency in the face of the overwhelming consensus of virtually every 
other state.  An examination of the shifting landscape of Oklahoma’s 
juvenile justice system and the different ways juveniles are treated under 
the law reveals at least two circumstances where due process demands that 
youths are competent to proceed.  First, where juveniles are prosecuted or 
sentenced in adult court they should be entitled to a competency standard 
that takes into consideration their unique development and maturity issues.  
                                                                                                                 
 174. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (“It is clear beyond dispute that the 
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And second, any certification process that makes that determination about 
whether a child will be prosecuted or sentenced in an adult criminal court 
should be preceded by a finding of adjudicative competence.  Making these 
adjustments to account for the changes in the juvenile system since G.J.I 
was decided twenty-two years ago is consistent with Oklahoma’s 
commitment to both a rehabilitative parens patriae philosophy and due 
process of law. 
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